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of fundamentalists is enough to stabilize prices. In contrast to related work,
which is based on simulations, we analytically prove that the presence of fun-
damentalists is not sufficient to avoid asset price bubbles. The behavior of
trend followers can result in exploding prices irrespective of fundamentalists’
investment decisions. We derive the upper boundaries for positive feedback
traders’ investments necessary to avoid exploding prices. In this situation,
intervention measures might be necessary in order to stabilize stock/asset
markets.
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1 Motivation
Financial market bubbles have repeatedly caused major macroeconomic prob-
lems, a very prominent example of which was the subprime havoc of 2007/2008
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). While misguided macroeconomic policies are
chief among the usual suspects in trying to understand such aberrations,
an important strand of the literature focuses on the question of whether
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specific behavior of market participants is responsible for price bubbles. In
particular, heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) analyze how both chartists
and fundamentalists are able to determine asset price movements (Hommes,
2006a).
Chartists, for example trend followers, trade based only on information
about the price process, that is, they assume that all important information
is present in the asset price (Graham et al., 1934). In contrast, fundamen-
talists have some fundamental value in mind and trade based on perceived
over- or undervaluation of the underlying asset. Trend followers magnify
the current trend, either positively or negatively, because their trading is
based on the philosophy that the greater the absolute value of the slope of
the price process, the more that should be invested or disinvested (Covel,
2004). Fundamentalists, in contrast, invest or disinvest, that is, increase or
decrease their investment, when the price is below or above the fundamental
value, thereby pushing the asset price toward its fundamental value. Traders
act out of self-interest with the intention of making a profit, and give little
thought to how their actions will impact prices. As a consequence of the two
different investment strategies, the presence of chartists can cause exploding
prices (De Long et al., 1990b), whereas fundamentalists are associated with
a stabilizing influence on assets. Thus, the following question arises:
Are the balancing effects of fundamentalists strong enough com-
pensate for the destabilizing impacts of chartists?
HAMs are increasingly employed in search of an answer to this ques-
tion (Gaunersdorfer and Hommes, 2005; Hommes, 2002; Lux, 1995, 1998;
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Lux and Marchesi, 1999, 2000).1 The models typically use bounded ratio-
nal agents, (imperfect) heuristics or rules of thumb, and nonlinear dynamics
(which might be chaotic). Some studies find that the stabilizing effects of fun-
damentalists are not necessarily strong enough to stabilize markets (Hommes,
2006a). However, the results are usually obtained via simulations and are not
analytically proven (Hommes, 2006a).2 thus leading to a second question:
Is it possible to analytically prove that chartists’ behavior can lead
to exploding prices irrespective of fundamentalists’ compensatory
effects?
The main contribution of our paper is a mathematically rigorous proof
that chartists’ behavior—specifically, the behavior of linear feedback traders
without rational expectations and without information about the market
1These studies provide useful explanations for many stylized facts, including excess
volatility, high trading volume, temporary bubbles, trend following, sudden crashes, mean
reversion, clustered volatility and fat tailed distribution returns. For an excellent overview
regarding HAM see the work of Hommes (2006a).
2An exception is the work of De Long et al. (1990b) which investigates the effect of
positive feedback traders and informed speculators, who evaluate and consider the needs of
the other market participants, especially the growing needs of the positive feedback traders,
in a three-period market model facing fundamentalists. De Long et al. (1990b) show that
the interaction of these two trader types pushes the price away from the fundamental
value under specific assumptions and despite the fundamentalists’ stabilizing behavior.
The present work differs from the work of De Long et al. (1990b) in that we do not
investigate how two types of traders—positive feedback traders and informed speculators—
jointly push up the price but instead look only at trend followers, nor do we assume a
predetermined end of the market.
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(e.g., fundamental value, trading volume, or even prices)—can overcome the
stabilizing effects of traders with rational expectations of the fundamental
value. Put differently, prices explode because the stabilizing effects of fun-
damentalists are outweighed by linear feedback traders. Unstable price de-
velopments are the result, which in turn increase the likelihood of a financial
bubble. As shown in the proof, thresholds for model-inherent values can be
specified that make certain the occurrence of a bubble. Furthermore, there
are certain values of external parameters that allow the thresholds of the
inherent values to be met. The analysis reveals that even fundamentalists
without any liquidity constraints and with perfect information about the
price, the fundamental value, and the market’s characteristics are not suffi-
cient to stabilize a very simply constructed market based on (excess) demand
if the feedback trader’s initial investment is large enough.
The field of applied mathematics has many new results concerning tech-
nical trading strategies (Barmish and Primbs, 2011, 2015). For example, the
performance properties of chartist strategies have been proven and explana-
tions given for why it is reasonable to trade according to a feedback strategy.
In contrast to the feedback trading literature, where the price taker property
is usually presumed, we study the effects of trading strategies in an HAM
that displays phenomena caused by (excess) demand (Baumann, 2015a).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the price model
as well as the investment strategies of feedback traders and fundamental-
ists. Section 3 answers the main question of the paper, that is, whether the
presence of fundamentalists is sufficient to stabilize the market. Section 4
presents further results based on the calculations of Section 3 and Section 5
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provides ideas for future work and concludes the paper.
2 Model Structure
The model consists of a one asset market and is populated with two types
of heterogeneous agents—fundamentalists and chartists. Their interaction
with the market maker is illustrated in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 presents
the price process in the interactive market model. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and
2.5 introduce the traders and their expectations. For simplification of the
analysis we assume that there is only one feedback trader, that is we treat
all existing feedback traders as one average feedback trader.3
2.1 Timeline
At the beginning of every period t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}, each agent ` ∈ {FT, FU},
where FT is the feedback trader (chartist) and FU the fundamentalist, de-
cides how to invest based on his investment strategy, where T is unknown or
even ∞. Each investment strategy I`t is guided by a different heuristic (rule
of thumb). Based on the strategy chosen, each agent then allocates his finan-
cial resources among the asset market. The trader is aware of past market
data and of expectations of future fundamental values E[ft+1]. The resulting
3There is indeed no difference between one feedback trader with an initial investment
IFT0 and fixed K, see Equation (3), and n feedback traders with initial investments
IFT0
n
and the same K. That is, for the feedback traders this summarization is without loss of
generality (WLOG). Whether this assumption is WLOG for fundamentalists, too, is left
to future work.
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Figure 1: Timeline of the traders’ and the market maker’s decisions and
interactions with ∆g`t = I
`
t−1 · ∆ptpt−1 .
changes in the investments, denoted by ∆I`t , are cleared by a market maker
who adjusts asset prices according to (excess) demand. After the traders
have observed the price change ∆pt, and hence their own gains or losses ∆g
`
t
in the recent period, they use this information in making their next invest-
ment decision.4 It is assumed that at the end of each period the investment
is capitalized and reinvested. Based on this understanding the price model is
constructed. The timeline of the traders’ and the market maker’s decisions
and interactions is shown in Figure 1.
2.2 Price Process for the Interactive Market Model
In feedback trading literature, price is usually determined through a certain
price process, for example, geometric Brownian motion (GBM), which is
exogenously given (Barmish and Primbs, 2015). This implies that the traders
4For all processes αt we set ∆αt = αt − αt−1 as the change of the underlying process,
e.g., ∆g`t is the period profit while g
`
t is the overall gain/loss of trader `.
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are not able to influence the price. To avoid this price taker property, which
is a strong restriction of every market model, agent-based price models have
evolved in the academic economics literature (Hommes, 2006a). According
to these models, the price is a function of traders’ investment decisions.
We denote the sum of all traders’ changes of investment at time t with
∆It =
∑
` ∆I
`
t . Based on the idea of interacting agents, Baumann (2015a)
constructs a pricing model that fulfills the law of (excess) demand, namely
(I1) pt+1 = pt, if ∆It = 0
(I2) pt+1 →∞, if ∆It →∞
(I3) pt+1 → 0, if ∆It → −∞
(I4) pt+1 strictly monotonous increasing in ∆It
For simplification, we assume an infinite supply,5 and thus the law of
supply and demand reduces to a law of (excess) demand.6 This model, which
5Infinite supply is, for example, given for synthetic assests, betting slips, etc. These
assets are produced by the market maker without any restriction. Thus, the market maker
can clear the market for sure. It follows that the market maker sets the new asset price
according to the changes in the asset demand only.
6Alternatively, one can define (I1)-(I4) by use of the buying/selling decision Bt :=
It− ptpt−1 · It−1 instead of the change of investment It− It−1. Then, a change of investment
caused by price increase would not affect the price. Based on simulations, use of the
buying/selling decision instead of the change of investment affects the proposition of this
paper only quantitatively, not qualitatively. However, a finite supply would make the
analysis much more complicated. In the work of Baumann and Baumann (2015), both the
HAM for stocks using Bt and the HAM for synthetic assets using ∆It are presented.
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is in a sense a natural generalization of the GBM (proven in Baumann,
2015a), in its general form is given by
pt+1 = pt · eM−1∆It (1)
= p0 · eM−1It (2)
where M > 0 is a scaling factor expressing the trading volume of the under-
lying asset.7 This pricing model is closed through a market maker (Drescher
and Herz, 2012). As is common practice, the market maker acts as a priv-
ileged trader that sets prices according to (excess) demand (see Figure 2)
and hence ensures market clearing (cf. the role of a broker in stock markets)
(Hommes, 2006a).8 Baumann and Baumann (2015) show that this market
model meets several stylized facts formulated by Hommes (2006b).
2.3 Feedback Traders
Barmish (2011); Barmish and Primbs (2011, 2015); Baumann (2015a) out-
line a special class of trading strategies based on control techniques, namely,
feedback trading. Traders engaged in this sort of strategy are called feedback
traders and utilize neither fundamentals nor the absolute asset value in mak-
ing their investments; they take into account only their own gains and losses.
Their strategy thus depends on prices relative to their previous investments,
7The pricing rule of Equation (1) is similar to that one Batista et al. (2015) use. Unless
otherwise stated, for simplicity M is set to M = 1.
8Possible profit making by and survival of the market maker will not be discussed in
the work at hand but is an interesting topic for future work.
9
market
maker
It =
k∑
j=1
I
`j
t
trader `2
trader `1
· · ·
trader `k
pt, g
`2
t
I`2t
pt, g
`1
t
I`1t
pt, g
`k
t
I`kt
information information
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the role of the market maker with k
traders.
that is, feedback traders are chartists because gains or losses, respectively,
are a function of the price but not of any fundamental value. From a control
theoretic point of view, feedback traders treat the price like a disturbance
variable and their strategy needs to be robust to this disturbing influence.
In calculating a certain trader’s gain, the market maker takes into account
the trader’s investment and the asset price.9 Therefore, for feedback traders
not only is it true that the investment affects the gain, but also that the gain
determines the investment.10
One specific feedback strategy, discussed by Barmish and Primbs (2011,
2012); Baumann (2015b), is the (positive) linear feedback strategy
IFTt := I
FT
0 + K · gFTt (3)
9The price is a function of all traders’ investment; see Section 2.2 and, especially,
Figure 2.
10In the literature, continuous time models are usually applied whereas this analysis
uses a discrete time model because this is, as mentioned by Barmish and Primbs (2011),
the weaker, more general assumption.
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Figure 3: Schematic interaction between market maker and linear feedback
trader.
where the linear feedback trader calculates his investment IFTt at time t as
a linear function of his gain/loss function gFTt using the initial investment
IFT0 > 0 and a feedback parameter K > 0. Figure 3 shows a feedback loop
between the gain or loss gFT of a linear feedback trader and his investment
IFT . By calculating the gain or loss of a specific trader (or group of traders)
` via
g`t =
t∑
i=1
I`i−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(4)
where pt denotes the price process
11 and I`t the trader’s investment at time
t, it follows that linear feedback traders are trend followers given IFTt > 0
(see also Equation (7)). A trader is called a trend follower (cf. Covel, 2004) if
his investment increases when prices are rising and decreases when prices are
falling. Note that the particular investment amount at time t ≥ 1 is given
by
∆IFTt = I
FT
t − IFTt−1 (5)
11The relative price change pt−pt−1pt−1 is called return on investment (ROI).
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= K · (gFTt − gFTt−1) (6)
= K · IFTt−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(7)
whereas IFTt denotes the total investment at time t (all individual investment
amounts up to time t) of feedback trader FT . Rising prices lead to increasing
gain for the linear feedback trader if IFTt > 0 and thus his investment increas,
too. Analogously, falling prices lower the gain and the trader disinvests.
Baumann (2015a) shows that in the event only one feedback trader is acting
on the market with the price process described by Equation (1), it holds that
It > 0 ∀t, (8)
∆It > 0 ∀t, and (9)
if ∃t : ∆It > ∆It−1 (10)
⇒ ∆It+1 > ∆It. (11)
This is important as it will be shown that, together with the results of Section
3, the price explosion effects of feedback traders, that would have occurred
in absence of fundamentalists can be compensated by fundamentalists—at
least to a certain degree.
Two typical investment paths can be identified in the scenario where
only one feedback-based trader is acting on the market. The two paths are
shown in Figure 4a and Figure 4b where the asset price pt is indicated with
a solid line and the feedback trader’s investment with a dashed one. If IFT0
lies below a specific threshold, IFTt converges (Figure 4a), if it is above this
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threshold the investment explodes (Figure 4b). Baumann (2015a) provides a
non-closed formula determining the threshold. Specific values can be derived
only through a simulation like the one in Figure 4 and by algorithmically
localizing the threshold.
Control-based trading strategies like the one presented by Barmish and
Primbs (2014) are interesting to further analyze since the literature contains
several notable results, for example, the guarantee of non-negative profit
for the simultaneously long short (SLS) strategy that has initial investment
zero and consists of two linear feedback strategies for continuously differen-
tiable prices (arbitrage!). For prices following a GBM, for price processes
allowing for jumps (Merton’s jump diffusion model [MJDM]), and for all es-
sentially linear prices one can expect positive profit for the SLS strategy,
i.e., E[gSLSt ] > 0 while ISLS0 = 0. 12 However, all of these settings assume
the price taker property, as the price process is defined independently of the
traders’ investments. In contrast, here we abandon the price taker property
12Barmish and Primbs (2011) show that a SLS strategy that is the sum of two particular
and opposed linear feedback strategies with initial investment zero always makes a positive
profit under the assumption of continuously differentiable prices. Furthermore, if in a
continuous time model prices follow a GBM the SLS strategy is expected to yield non-
negative profit (as proven in Barmish and Primbs, 2011). Baumann (2015b) shows that
even for a discontinuous price process characterized through MJDM, SLS trading is still
profitable, independent of intensity, type, and height of jumps. Continuously differentiable
prices, GBM, and MJDM all fulfill the price taker property that is usually assumed in
literature about feedback trading (see, e.g., Barmish, 2011; Barmish and Primbs, 2011).
Furthermore, Baumann and Gru¨ne (2015) show that ISLS0 = 0 and E[gSLSt ] > 0 under the
price taker assumption hold even for all essentially linear prices.
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(a) IFT0 below a specific threshold:
IFTt (dashed line) converges. {p0 =
1,M = 1, T = 50, FT (IFT0 =
0.3,K = 1)}.
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(b) IFT0 above a specific threshold:
IFTt (dashed line) diverges. {p0 =
1,M = 1, T = 13, FT (IFT0 =
0.4,K = 1)}.
Figure 4: Investment of feedback traders is indicated with a dashed line,
development of the asset price pt is indicated with a solid line; note the
different scaling of the vertical axes.
assumption and instead consider an interactive market model, as introduced
by Baumann (2015a), as we want to examine the price’s behavior under
heterogeneous agents.
By transforming Equation (7), the feedback trader’s investment rate, we
see that linear feedback traders follow a strategy that can be written as
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + K · IFTt−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(12)
= IFTt−1 + K · IFTt−1 · (eM
−1∆It−1 − 1) (13)
which leads to an investment of
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + K · IFTt−1 · (eM
−1∆IFTt−1 − 1), (14)
14
when only one trader, the linear feedback trader, is acting on the market.
To sum up, the idea behind the linear feedback trading strategy is that
money can be made by following the price trend.
2.4 Fundamentalists
As explained in Section 1, fundamentalists invest when the price is below the
fundamental value ft > 0 and disinvest when the price is above the funda-
mental value.13 Thus, it is of particular interest how much fundamentalists
invest or disinvest in the respective cases. For deterministic fundamental val-
ues ft, i.e., the fundamental value is a function in t, one way of determining
the investment rate is
∆IFUt = M · ln
ft+1
pt
. (15)
In this case fundamentalists do not need to estimate the fundamental value
because it is fixed and certain. Traders following the investment rule of
Equation (15) could be called strong fundamentalists because their invest-
ment strategy could push the price back to its fundamental value at any
time. If the strong fundamentalist is the only trader buying/selling at time
t, then for any pt > 0 and ft+1 it follows:
pt+1 = pt · eln
ft+1
pt (16)
13If, for example, the fundamental value is below the asset price, fundamentalists con-
clude that the price will decrease in the long run, not directly in the next step. So they do
not necessarily disinvest so much that their investment becomes negative, but they reduce
their investment which is also a disinvestment.
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= pt · ft+1
pt
(17)
= ft+1 (18)
Section 2.5 presents the case of a fundamentalist trading based on a distorted
fundamental value. It turns out, however, that this distortion does not affect
the general behavior of the market model.
2.5 Expectations and Noise
Some types of traders, for example, informed speculators (De Long et al.,
1990b), base their trading decisions on rational expectations. Is this the case
for feedback traders and fundamentalists?
In general, for feedback traders and trend followers, the answer is “no,”
as they only assume the existence of a trend. For example, based on the
current slope of asset price development (pt − pt−1) they forecast the future
direction of the asset. However, fundamentalists are assumed to have rational
expectations (see, e.g., Drescher and Herz, 2012). Generally, they pursue the
strategy
∆IFUt = M · ln
E[ft+1|ft]
pt
. (19)
Even a casual observation of real markets makes it clear that price fluc-
tuations are seldom purely rational. There is always noise and uncertainty
in the market, a factor considered essential by many economists (see, e.g.,
Black, 1986; De Long et al., 1990a). Some reasons for noise include that
traders make mistakes, trade on unreliable (noisy) information, or simply
enjoy trading and are not overly concerned with being rational about it.
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Here, we do not assume that traders are making mistakes, as this would
lead to completely unexpected, unsystematic behavior. Furthermore, both
feedback traders and fundamentalists do follow a specified strategy. Thus the
only way noise could enter the market is through noisy information. However,
the traders’ investments as well as the price, announced by the market maker
(see Figure 1), are not distorted. The only information that could be noisy
is that about the fundamental value. In this case, the fundamentalist has
to estimate ft+1 at time t and trade according to Equation (19). Since it
is unreasonable that |ft+1 − E[ft+1]| becomes arbitrary large but exploding
prices imply |pt − ft| → ∞, the effects of noisy information do not play a
decisive role.
Therefore, we a priori consider ft a deterministic fundamental value in
the presented work.
3 Proof of Limitations of Fundamentalists’
Stabilizing Effects
In this section we demonstrate, analytically and mathematically rigorously,
that fundamentalists are not always able to stabilize markets through their
trading actions. We inductively prove, in contrast to simulations, that effects
of linear feedback traders dominate those of fundamentalists and destabilize
markets.
Since we habe already defined the pricing model (Equation (1)) and the
traders, the next task is to check whether fundamentalists defined according
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to Equation (15) are able to stabilize the price when trading simultaneously
on the market with linear feedback traders following Equations (3) and (4).
To simplify the notation, we set ft ≡ 1. This is one special case, but if we can
show the destabilizing effects of feedback traders’ investment strategy for this
case, it will prove that fundamentalists do not always have market stabilizing
effects. The proof proceeds without using technical trading restrictions, for
example, limits on feedback traders’ investment amount.
These two trader types are suitable for analyzing the problem because
if it turns out that prices explode for appropriately chosen parameters IFT0
and K of linear feedback traders even when acting on a market with funda-
mentalists who are employing an investment strategy that could bring prices
close to the fundamental value at every point of time, it will be strong evi-
dence that chartists’ rules, in this case the linear feedback strategy are able
to overcome the effects of strong fundamentalists. Why it is enough to con-
sider only linear feedback traders and fundamentalists and no other type
of traders, some of which are presented by Baumann and Baumann (2015),
becomes obvious when taking into consideration that if feedback traders’ in-
vestment goes to infinity which means prices explode, then also the absolute
value of fundamentalists’ investment goes to infinity. Thus, compared to the
exploding investments of feedback traders and fundamentalists, the relatively
small investment14 of other possible traders may be neglected at least for our
14Trend followers invest a lot when prices rise strongly and fundamentalist disinvest a
lot when price greatly exceeds the fundamental value, i.e., the investment of trend followers
goes against infinity and that of fundamentalists goes against minus infinity. For traders
who neither predicate their investment on the distance of fundamental value and price
18
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(a) Price and feedback trader’s in-
vestment converging, i.e., fundamen-
talists’ effects predominate; param-
eters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T =
50, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 = 10,K =
0.5)}.
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(b) Price and feedback trader’s in-
vestment diverging, i.e., feedback
traders’ effects predominate; param-
eters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T =
3, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 = 15,K =
0.5)}.
Figure 5: Two typical situations in a market involving feedback traders and
fundamentalists (notice: T differs in the two figures for purposes of readabil-
ity).
analysis.15
Simulations reveal two typical price developments (see Figures 5a and 5b).
In Figure 5a, fundamentalists’ effects predominate and the price stabilizes
around the fundamental value. In Section 4, this converging investment effect
is shown when K = 1, where K is the feedback parameter from Equation (3),
nor on the slope of the price it is unreasonable that their investment goes against (minus)
infinity.
15For moving average traders (MA) and noise traders (NO), both presented by Bau-
mann and Baumann (2015) and needed for a valid market model as also shown by Baumann
and Baumann (2015), usually |∆IMAt | ≤ ∆I∗ and P (|∆NOt | > B)→ 0 holds for B →∞.
Thus, only |∆IFTt | and |∆IFUt | can become arbitrarily large which is the only interesting
contribution for bubble analysis.
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and a specific limit value for IFT0 is computed. In Figure 5b, however, market
development is not that obvious. At first glance, the figure might suggest
that prices explode. But as the simulation software reaches its limits, it
becomes unclear whether or not prices level out in these simulation scenarios.
We therefore need an analytical examination. In cases like those shown
in the simulated Figure 5b, the proposition of Theorem 1 determines with
certainty whether the investment of feedback traders is in fact exploding, or
whether this only looks to be the case due to simulation insufficiencies and
the investment will eventually stabilize, but with a greater amplitude, for
example, as in Figure 5a.
To simplify the expressions in the model, we assume that ft ≡ 1 and
p0 = 1 in all upcoming equations. This choice is just one possible scaling but
does not change the model’s dynamics in general. It holds:16
∆IFUt = M · ln
ft+1
pt
(20)
= −M · ln eM−1It−1 (21)
= −It−1 (22)
= −IFTt−1 − IFUt−1 (23)
⇒ IFUt = −IFTt−1 (24)
⇒ ∆IFUt = −∆IFTt−1 (25)
16We define a process αt as (αt)t∈Z ⊂ R with αt = 0 ∀t < 0. Furthermore, we define the
∆-operator as ∆kαt := ∆
k−1αt −∆k−1αt−1, ∆1αt := ∆αt = αt − αt−1, and ∆0αt := αt.
A price process pt is strictly positive, i.e., (pt)t > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
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With this, we can specify Equation (13), which describes the investment of
the feedback traders:
∆IFTt = K · IFTt−1(eM
−1(∆IFTt−1+∆I
FU
t−1) − 1) (26)
= K · IFTt−1(eM
−1(∆IFTt−1−∆IFTt−2) − 1) (27)
= K · IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (28)
Theorem 1 tells us conditions for the feedback trader’s investment IFT and
its derivatives for which prices explode. Note that the following implication
holds:
∆kIFTt−1 > a ∧ ∆k+1IFTt > b ⇒ ∆kIFTt > a + b. (29)
We obtain this directly from the definition of the delta operator which is
equivalent to
∆kIFTt = ∆
k+1IFTt + ∆
kIFTt−1. (30)
Theorem 1. For the investment of the positive linear feedback trader (Equa-
tion (3)) interacting with a strong fundamentalist (Equation (15)) on the
market model (Equation (1)), under conditions
∆3IFTt > M · ln 2, (31)
∆2IFTt > M · ln 2 ·max
{
1, K−1
}
, (32)
∆IFTt−1 > 0, and (33)
IFTt−2 > 0 (34)
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it follows that
∆kIFTt+1 > M · ln 2 ∀k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} (35)
and
∆2IFTt+1 > M · ln 2 ·K−1. (36)
This means, the feedback trader’s investment, the slope of investment, the
curvature of investment, and the increase of the curvature of the investment
are strictly greater than M · ln 2 for all t ≥ t∗ for some t∗. All in all, this is a
fast exploding investment, which leads to an equally quickly exploding price.
pt+1 = pt · eM−1·(∆IFUt +∆IFTt ) (37)
= pt · eln
ft+1
pt · eM−1·∆IFTt (38)
= ft+1 · eM−1·∆IFTt (39)
As an interpretation, note that under Equation (24), fundamentalists always
respond one period later with the inversed investment of feedback traders.
In other words, the feedback trader’s investment increases, the rate of
increase increases, and the rate of this growth increases. Furthermore, all
of these growth rates are bounded from below. Since the fundamentalist’s
investment is minus the investment of the feedback trader from one period
before the ratio of the (dis-)invested amounts is strictly increasing, that is
the feedback trader’s exploding effect predominates the fundamentalist’s sta-
bilizing one. Theorem 1 is proven by induction in the following.
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Proof. It is enough to prove Equation (35) for k = 3 as all other inequalities
can then be derived from Equation (29), respectively, Equation (30).
1
K
∆3IFTt+1 =
1
K
(∆2IFTt+1 −∆2IFTt ) (40)
=
1
K
(∆IFTt+1 − 2∆IFTt + ∆IFTt−1) (41)
= IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (42)
− 2IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (43)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (44)
= (IFTt−2 + ∆I
FT
t−1 + ∆I
FT
t )(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (45)
− 2(IFTt−2 + ∆IFTt−1)(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (46)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (47)
= IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (48)
+ ∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (49)
+ ∆IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (50)
− 2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (51)
− 2∆IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (52)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (53)
= IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 2eM−1∆2IFTt−1 + eM−1∆2IFTt−2) (54)
+ 2∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt − eM−1∆2IFTt−1) (55)
+ ∆IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (56)
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We evaluate these summands separately:
(55) = 2∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt−1+M
−1∆3IFTt − eM−1∆2IFTt−1) (57)
= 2∆IFTt−1e
M−1∆2IFTt−1(eM
−1∆3IFTt − 1) (58)
> 2∆IFTt−1e
M−1∆2IFTt−1(2− 1) (59)
> 0 (60)
(56) = (∆IFTt−1 + ∆
2IFTt )(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (61)
> 0 + M ·max{ln 2, ln 2
K
} (62)
> M · ln 2
K
(63)
(54) = IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2+M
−1∆3IFTt−1+M
−1∆3IFTt (64)
− 2eM−1∆2IFTt−2+M−1∆3IFTt−1 + eM−1∆2IFTt−2) (65)
= IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆3IFTt−1(eM
−1∆3IFTt − 2) + 1) (66)
> IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆3IFTt−1(2− 2) + 1) (67)
= IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 (68)
> 0 (69)
As a result, we obtain
∆3IFTt+1 > M · ln 2. (70)
That the conditions for the endogenous variables IFTt−2,∆I
FT
t−1,∆
2IFTt ,∆
3IFTt
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may be fulfilled for some t (and some parameter assignment) is shown in Ta-
ble 1 in which the investment development of the feedback trader and its
derivatives are listed for IFT0 = 15, K = 0.5, and M = 10. In short, there
are exogenous variables that lead to price explosion. This demonstrates that
feedback traders’ effects are able to overcome fundamentalists’ effects.
On the other hand, Table 2 sets out a situation where price would explode
when only feedback traders are acting on the market. Equations (8)–(10) hold
for the feedback traders, so, according to Baumann (2015a), their investment
causes a bubble even in the absence of any other traders. However, if funda-
mentalists enter the market price explosion is prevented, as the investment
rates tend to 0 at time t = 80 in Table 2. Clearly, the conditions of Theorem
1 for feedback traders are not satisfied.
In summary, even a strong fundamentalist investment rule, that is a strat-
egy without any restrictions and involving a possibly infinitely large invest-
ment amount, is not able to stabilize the market when a trader using very
simple linear feedback strategy with an adequate initial investment is acting
on the market, too. Market failures can happen, prices may explode, and the
investment behavior of strong fundamentalists cannot prevent this.
4 Further Results for K = 1
To this point, we have demonstrated that the pricing model described in
Equation (1) together with a quite simple chartist rule can create a financial
bubble even when fundamentalists are acrive in the market. We now discuss
some further results and special features of the market model when the linear
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feedback trader is assumend to ba reasonable all-in feedback trader, that is,
one who invests all of his gain but nothing more, i.e., K = 1. Formula
simplifications for the feedback trader’s investment are given for two specific
cases. The first is a market with only a linear feedback trader; the second is a
market with a linear feedback trader and a fundamentalist. Furthermore, as
mentioned in Section 3, if existing, the limits of the investment are calculated.
For simplicity we set M = 1.
4.1 Case 1: All-In Linear Feedback Trader
In the first case with only one linear feedback trader, Equation (14) simplifies
to:
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + I
FT
t−1 · (e∆I
FT
t−1 − 1) (71)
= IFTt−1 · e∆I
FT
t−1 (72)
= IFT0 · e∆I
FT
0 · · · e∆IFTt−1 (73)
= IFT0 · eI
FT
t−1 (74)
In the case that IFTt converges to some value it follows
lim
t→∞
IFTt = −lw(−IFT0 ), (75)
where lw denotes the Lambert-W-function.17
17The Lambert-W-function is the inverse function of f(x) = x · ex.
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4.2 Case 2: All-In Linear Feedback Trader and Fun-
damentalist
In the second case, to arrive at the simplified feedback trader’s investment
amount, we need to rewrite Equations (13) and (28) to take into consideration
the fundamentalist’s investment amount:
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + I
FT
t−1(e
∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (76)
= IFT0 · e∆
2IFT0 · · · e∆2IFTt−1 (77)
= IFT0 · e∆I
FT
t−1 (78)
In the case where only linear feedback traders and fundamentalists are
acting on the market—which is also the setting of the main result in Section
3—with K = 1 it is easy to calculate the limit of the feedback trader’s
investment, assuming that one exists (see, e.g., Figure 6): If IFTt → c ∈ R⇒
∆IFTt → 0 and by using Equation (78):
lim
t→∞
IFTt = I
FT
0 (79)
Figure 6a illustrates the outcome. Note that, due to Equation (28) (market
with feedback trader and fundamentalist), for K ∈ (0, 1] we have IFTt ≥ 0,
i.e., the linear feedback trader is a long trader. In contrast, for K > 1,
negative investments IFTt may occur, as shown in Figure 6b.
18
18When rewriting Equation (12) to IFTt = I
FT
t−1
(
1 +K · pt−pt−1pt−1
)
and noting that the
return on investment is always bigger than minus one, it follows that for K > 0 it holds
IFTt > 0, too.
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(a) Feedback trader’s investment
converging to the initial investment
IFT0 ; parameters {p0 = 1,M =
10, T = 50, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 =
8,K = 1)}.
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(b) Negative investment of feedback
trader; parameters {p0 = 1,M =
10, T = 50, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 =
1,K = 10)}.
Figure 6: Two specific situations in a market model involving feedback
traders and fundamentalists.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that trend followers may cause price explosions regard-
less of fundamentalists’ investment decisions. Specifically, Theorem 1 and its
proof analytically show that a fundamentalist’s investment strategy, that is
a strategy that pushes prices toward their fundamental values, can be insuffi-
cient to dominate linear feedback trading strategies. However, the potential
for feedback traders’ to create a bubble appears to be lower (Equations (31)–
(34)) when fundamentalists are active in the market (cf. Equations (8)–(10)).
Although the results indicate that fundamentalists have a stabilizing effect,
this effect is limited up to some threshold value (cf. Table 2).
The analysis also shows that for identical investment decisions price move-
ments are more volatile at higher price levels compared to at lower price
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levels. Thus, even this simply constructed market model is able to capture
certain market phenomena.
For future research, it might be interesting to allow for different pro-
portions of fundamentalists and trend followers and therewith analyze the
market behavior depending on this proportion. Also adding sentimentalists,
always adapting the better working strategy of the other traders, might be
an interesting generalization.
Given our results and the fact that financial bubbles are associated with
high economic costs an important question arises: Seeing as fundamentalists
do not appear to be an adequate market stabilizing force, is there another
type of trader, perhaps the market maker, that would be able to stabilize
prices in a market-appropriate way and, if so, what would such a trader look
like?
Generally, our analysis supports the view that intervention measures or
at least some kind of incentive system is necessary to stabilize asset markets
and prevent financial bubbles. Such measures could for example be the di-
rect intervention of some control authority, progressive transaction costs, or
trading restrictions.
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IFTt ∆I
FT
t ∆
2IFTt ∆
3IFTt
t = 0 15 15 15 15
t = 1 41.112668 26.112668 11.112668 -3.88733197
t = 2 83.0106859 41.8980179 15.7853499 4.67268186
t = 3 242.716956 159.70627 117.808252 102.022902
t = 4 15864296.3 15864053.3 15863893.8 15863776
Table 1: The boxed table entries fulfill the conditions of Theorem 1 for t = 3
for which prices explode; market parameters are as in Figure 5b.
IFTt ∆I
FT
t ∆
2IFTt ∆
3IFTt
t = 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
t = 1 0.59672988 0.19672988 -0.2032701 -0.6032701
· · ·
t = 5 0.39734101 0.02131807 0.05226206 -0.069616
· · ·
t = 80 ≈0.4 ≈0 ≈0 ≈0
Table 2: The table shows a situation where price would explode without
fundamentalists but is stabilized by them. The investment parameters are
the same as for Figure 4b where prices explode. The boxed cells fulfill the
conditions required by Equations (8)-(10).
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